

Are Unvaccinated Children and Adults a Threat to National Security?

December 11, 2021

Presented by: **Karen Kingston**

miFiGHT





Public Health Emergency

Public Health and Medical Emergency Support for a Nation Prepared

PHE Home > Emergency > News & Multimedia > Public Health Actions > PHE > Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists

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Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists

As a result of confirmed cases of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), on this date and after consultation with public health officials as necessary, I, Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby determine that a public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020, nationwide.

01/31/2020

/s/

Date

Alex M. Azar II

Laboratory-Confirmed COVID-19 Among Adults Hospitalized with COVID-19–Like Illness with Infection-Induced or mRNA Vaccine-Induced SARS-CoV-2 Immunity — Nine States, January–September 2021

TABLE 2. Adjusted odds ratios* of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 among hospitalizations in adults with COVID-19–like illness comparing unvaccinated adults with a SARS-CoV-2 infection occurring 90–179 days before the index test date and adults who were fully vaccinated 90–179 days before the index test date without a previous documented SARS-CoV-2 infection — nine states, January–September 2021

Outcome	Total no.	No. (row %) of SARS-CoV-2 positive test results	Adjusted odds ratio (95% CI)
All adults (aged ≥18 years), any COVID-19 mRNA vaccine			
Any mRNA vaccine			
Fully vaccinated† without previous documented infection	6,328	324 (5.1) %	Ref
Unvaccinated with a previous SARS-CoV-2 infection	1,020	89 (8.7) %	5.49 (2.75–10.99)

TABLE 2. Adjusted odds ratios* of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 among hospitalizations in adults with COVID-19-like illness comparing unvaccinated adults with a SARS-CoV-2 infection occurring 90–179 days before the index test date and adults who were fully vaccinated 90–179 days before the index test date without a previous documented SARS-CoV-2 infection — nine states, January–September 2021

By time relative to SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant predominance

Before Delta predominance (January–June 2021)

Fully vaccinated† without previous documented infection	1,115	18 (1.6)	Ref
Unvaccinated with a previous SARS-CoV-2 infection	831	70 (8.4)	6.11 (2.83–13.16)

During Delta predominance (June–September 2021)**

Fully vaccinated† without previous documented infection	5,213	306 (5.9)	Ref
Unvaccinated with a previous SARS-CoV-2 infection	189	19 (10.1)	7.55 (3.45–16.52)

Pfizer Phase 3 Primary Efficacy Outcome was *ONLY* 7 DAYS Post 2-Dose

(Data from Table 7) **Efficacy** of BNT162b2 Against **CONFIRMED** COVID-19 **from 7 DAYS After Dose 2** in Participants with and without Evidence of Prior SARS-CoV-2 Infection, **pg. 24**

Table 7. Efficacy of BNT162b2 Against Confirmed COVID-19 From 7 Days After Dose 2 in Participants With and Without Evidence of Prior SARS-CoV-2 Infection, Evaluable Efficacy Population

Pre-specified Age Group	BNT162b2 N^a = 19965 Cases n1^b Surveillance Time^c (n2^d)	Placebo N^a = 20172 Cases n1^b Surveillance Time^c (n2^d)	Vaccine Efficacy % (95% CI)	Met Predefined Success Criterion*
All participants	9 2.332 (18559)	169 2.345 (18708)	94.6 (89.9, 97.3) ^e	Yes
16 to 55 years	6 1.309 (10653)	120 1.317 (10738)	95.0 (88.7, 98.2) ^f	NA
>55 years	3 1.022 (7892)	49 1.028 (7956)	93.8 (80.9, 98.8) ^f	NA

*Success criterion: the posterior probability that true vaccine efficacy >30% conditioning on the available data is >99.5% at the final analysis

^a N = number of participants in the specified group.

Pfizer Phase 3 Primary Efficacy Outcome was *ONLY* 7 DAYS Post 2-Dose

U.S. Phase 2/3 Trials were conducted in the US, Brazil, Argentina, S. Africa, Germany and Turkey
 US = 6,653 OUS = 36,998 % US = 6,653/43,651 = 15% of subjects were in the US

(Data from Table 7) **Efficacy** of BNT162b2 Against **CONFIRMED** COVID-19 **from 7 DAYS After Dose 2** in Participants with and without Evidence of Prior SARS-CoV-2 Infection, **pg. 24**

Study Group	N-Value	Number Infected (RT-PCR+)	Infection Risk (IFR)	Reduction in Infection Risk	Vaccine Efficacy = Confidence Interval
Placebo	18,559	169	.910%		
PFE Vaccine	18,708	9	.048%	0.862%	95%
Total	37,307				

<https://www.fda.gov/media/144416/download>

CONCLUSION: The Pfizer BNT162b Reduces Risk of Infection by less than 1% for up to 7 DAYS Post 7-Days Second Dose Compared to Placebo.

BMJ INVESTIGATION

Covid-19: Researcher blows the whistle on data integrity issues in Pfizer's vaccine trial

After Jackson left the company problems persisted at Ventavia, this employee said. In several cases Ventavia lacked enough employees to swab all trial participants who reported covid-like symptoms, to test for infection. Laboratory confirmed symptomatic covid-19 was the trial's primary endpoint, the employee noted. (An FDA review memorandum released in August this year states that across the full trial swabs were not taken from 477 people with suspected cases of symptomatic covid-19.)

"I don't think it was good clean data," the employee said of the data Ventavia generated for the Pfizer trial. "It's a crazy mess."

A second employee also described an environment at Ventavia unlike any she had experienced in her 20 years doing research. She told *The BMJ* that, shortly after Ventavia fired Jackson, Pfizer was notified of problems at Ventavia with the vaccine trial and that an audit took place.

<https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/375/bmj.n2635.full.pdf>

Symptomatic but “NOT CONFIRMED” COVID-19 within 7 DAYS After Dose 1 or 2, pg. 41

Suspected COVID-19 Cases

Among 3,410 total cases of suspected but unconfirmed COVID-19 in the overall study population, 1,594 occurred in the vaccine group vs. 1816 in the placebo group. Suspected COVID-19 cases that occurred within 7 days after any vaccination were 409 in the vaccine group vs. 287 in the placebo group. It is possible that the imbalance in suspected COVID-19 cases occurring in the 7 days postvaccination represents vaccine reactogenicity with symptoms that overlap with those of COVID-19. Overall though, these data do not raise a concern that protocol-specified reporting of suspected, but unconfirmed COVID-19 cases could have masked clinically significant adverse events that would not have otherwise been detected.

For another secondary endpoint, the case definition for a severe COVID-19 case was a confirmed COVID-19 case with at least one of the following:

- Clinical signs at rest indicative of severe systemic illness (RR ≥ 30 breaths per minute, HR ≥ 125 beats per minute, SpO₂ $\leq 93\%$ on room air at sea level, or PaO₂/FiO₂ < 300 mm Hg);
- Respiratory failure (defined as needing high-flow oxygen, noninvasive ventilation, mechanical ventilation, or ECMO);
- Evidence of shock (SBP < 90 mm Hg, DBP < 60 mm Hg, or requiring vasopressors)
- Significant acute renal, hepatic, or neurologic dysfunction;
- Admission to an ICU;
- Death.

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FDA/CBER Plans for Monitoring COVID-19 Vaccine Safety & Effectiveness

Presented by: Steve Anderson, PhD, MPP – Dir. Office of Biostats & Epidemiology, CBER

October 22, 2020 – Vaccines & Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) Meeting

FDA Safety Surveillance of COVID-19 Vaccines : DRAFT Working list of possible adverse event outcomes

Subject to change

- Guillain-Barré syndrome
- Acute disseminated encephalomyelitis
- Transverse myelitis
- Encephalitis/myelitis/encephalomyelitis/
meningoencephalitis/meningitis/
encephalopathy
- Convulsions/seizures
- Stroke
- Narcolepsy and cataplexy
- Anaphylaxis
- Acute myocardial infarction
- Myocarditis/pericarditis
- Autoimmune disease
- Deaths
- Pregnancy and birth outcomes
- Other acute demyelinating diseases
- Non-anaphylactic allergic reactions
- Thrombocytopenia
- Disseminated intravascular coagulation
- Venous thromboembolism
- Arthritis and arthralgia/joint pain
- Kawasaki disease
- Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome
in Children
- Vaccine enhanced disease



Licensure and Emergency Use Authorization of Vaccines to Prevent COVID-19 for Use in
Pediatric Populations

2.1.1. Clinical endpoint efficacy trials

The incidence and severity of COVID-19 disease in pediatric populations, especially in younger age groups, are generally lower than in adults. Depending on epidemiologic trends, an adequately powered clinical endpoint efficacy trial with sufficient case accrual across pediatric age groups may be very difficult, if not infeasible, to conduct. Furthermore, in considering the balance of benefits and risks to support licensure or emergency use authorization of COVID-19 vaccines for use in pediatric populations, it could be argued that the lower burden of disease in pediatric populations might warrant more stringent success criteria than for adults, at least for placebo-controlled trials. A very high VE point estimate, with a narrow confidence interval, observed in studies in adults might also warrant more stringent success criteria in pediatric trials to ensure that the vaccine is as effective in pediatric populations as it is in adult populations. Conversely, an argument could be made that demonstration of very high VE in adults could allow for a less stringent success criterion for the VE confidence interval lower bound in pediatric trials (and thus a smaller number of primary endpoint cases needed), provided that the VE point estimate is similar to that observed in adults. The choice of primary endpoint may also inform appropriately stringent success criteria for placebo-controlled pediatric trials, as data demonstrating prevention of infection (rather than prevention of disease, or prevention of severe disease) may be less likely for children vs. adults.

Solicited reactogenicity data in adolescents 16-17 years of age are not available for the reporting period. Reactogenicity data from a total of 100 adolescents 12 through 15 years of age enrolled in C4591001 Phase 2/3 were provided in the EUA submission. However, the Sponsor did not request inclusion of this age group in the EUA because the available data, including number of participants and follow-up duration, were

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Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine Emergency Use Authorization Review Memorandum

insufficient to support favorable a benefit-risk determination at this time. Therefore, the reactogenicity data for participants 12 through 15 years of age are not presented in this document.

Pfizer/COMIRNATY Post-FDA Approval Studies

POSTMARKETING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 505(o)

11. Study C4591007 substudy to evaluate the immunogenicity and safety of lower dose levels of COMIRNATY in individuals 12 through <30 years of age.

Final Report Submission: May 31, 2024

<https://www.fda.gov/media/151710/download>

“A major problem with protein-based therapeutics is their immunogenicity, that is, their tendency to trigger an unwanted immune response against themselves... Such antibodies can cause complications that can be life threatening.”

<https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/biologics-research-projects/immunogenicity-protein-based-therapeutics>

Harnessing the immune system's full potential to fight human disease

This NEVER should have happened to Maddie!

***Albert Bourla, Anthony Fauci, Francis Collins, Rochelle Walensky, & FDA
EUA Panel Members CONSPIRED to COMMIT AGGRAVATED ASSAULT and
MURDER of CHILDREN with a BIOWEAPON.***



5 EUA AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR THE PFIZER-BIONTECH COVID-19 VACCINE FOR USE IN CHILDREN 5-11 YEARS OF AGE

Vaccine formulation

To provide a vaccine with an improved stability profile, the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for use in children 5-11 years of age uses tromethamine (Tris) buffer instead of the phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) as used in the previous formulation and excludes sodium chloride and potassium chloride. The packaged vials for the new formulation are stored frozen at -90°C to -60°C. The frozen vials may be thawed and stored at refrigerator at 2°C to 8°C for up to 10 weeks.

Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee Meeting

September 17, 2021

FDA Briefing Document

Application for licensure of a booster dose for COMIRNATY (COVID-19 Vaccine, mRNA)

Although not independently verified by FDA, the post hoc analysis appears to indicate that the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 during the analysis period among 18,727 study participants originally randomized to BNT162b2 (mean of 9.8 months post-Dose 2 at the beginning of the analysis period) was 70.3 cases per 1,000 person-years, compared with an incidence of 51.6 cases per 1,000 person-years among 17,748 study participants originally randomized to placebo and crossed over to BNT162b2 (mean of 4.7 months post-Dose 2 at the beginning of the analysis period). An additional analysis appears to indicate that incidence of COVID-19 generally increased in each group of study participants with increasing time post-Dose 2 at the start of the analysis period. Only 3 severe COVID-19 cases were reported during the analysis period, all of which occurred among study participants originally randomized to BNT162b2. <https://www.fda.gov/media/152176/download>

Effectiveness of mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines Against the Delta Variant Among 5.6M Medicare Beneficiaries 65 Years and Older

Weekly update of September 28, 2021



Project Salus



<https://www.humetrix.com/powerpoint-vaccine.html>

VE Study Attributes

Cohort

20M Medicare beneficiaries nationwide
with 16M individuals 65 years and older

Exposure

5.6M fully vaccinated with
2.7M Pfizer and 2.9M Moderna

Period of study


January - August 21 2021

Breakthrough Key Metrics

161K Breakthrough cases

33K Breakthrough hospitalizations


10.4K requiring ICU admissions



Other Platform Applications



Nationwide Mapping of COVID-19 Outcomes
Hospitalizations, ICU, Ventilator Rx, Deaths



Disease Risk Models with Population Risk Profiling: Severe COVID-19 risk with Validation with Hospitalization Rates



Vaccination Mapping overlaid on severe COVID-19 risk

Project Salus provides answers
to these questions

Basic questions which require
data-driven answers

Is vaccine effectiveness (VE)
waning over time?


Is VE **reduced** for the **Delta**
variant?

Does the need vary by
sub-population?

- VE of both mRNA vaccines appears to wane over time in this large 5.6M US-based 65 & over vaccinated cohort
- Risk of breakthrough hospitalization increases with time elapsed since mRNA vaccination with odds ratio increasing to 2.5 at 6 months post vaccination
- VE against Delta breakthrough hospitalization (62%) exceeds VE against Delta infection (41%)
- Prior COVID-19 infection has a major protective effect against breakthrough hospitalization
- Older age groups (75-84 & 85 and older) experienced further reduction in vaccine protection against hospitalization
- Hospitalization rate (21% vs 32%) and death rate (4% vs 12%) of breakthrough infections lower than rates observed in Covid-19 cases in pre-vaccination pandemic phase in 2020

Graphic adapted from CDC Presentation ACIP Meeting August 30, 2021
Oliver, S. Framework for Booster Doses of COVID-19 Vaccines

Total & Breakthrough Cases in the 65 Years and Older Salus Cohort




- As Delta variant became predominant, COVID-19 cases increased five-fold in the ≥ 65 population
- In this 80% vaccinated ≥ 65 population, an estimated **71% of COVID-19 cases occurred in fully vaccinated individuals**

Breakthrough cases = 71% of total Covid-19 cases in cohort

Week ending 08/28/21, data incomplete due to lag in claims processing

Is mRNA Vaccine Effectiveness Against Delta Breakthrough Infection Waning Over Time in 65 Years and Older Salus Cohort?




■ Breakthrough infection rates 5-6 months post vaccination are twice as high as 3-4 months post vaccination

95% CI

♀ Breakthrough infection rates 5-6 months since vaccination > 3-4 months since vaccination
 $P < 0.001$

Total & Breakthrough Hospitalizations in the 65 Years and Older Cohort



- As Delta variant surged to over 50% in June, COVID-19 hospitalizations more than doubled, reversing the prior trend of decreasing hospitalizations since April
- In this 80% vaccinated 65+ population, an estimated 60% of COVID-19 hospitalizations occurred in fully vaccinated individuals in the week ending August 7th

60% of COVID-19 hospitalizations are in vaccinated individuals

On 08/14/21, data incomplete due to lag in claims processing

The Science Suggests a Wuhan Lab Leak

By Steven Quay and Richard Muller

June 6, 2021 11:59 am ET

The Covid-19 pathogen has a genetic footprint that has never been observed in a natural coronavirus.

Although the **double CGG is suppressed naturally, the opposite is true in laboratory work.** The **insertion sequence of choice is the double CGG.** That's because it is readily available and convenient, and scientists have a great deal of experience inserting it. An additional advantage of **the double CGG sequence** compared with the other 35 possible choices: It **creates a useful beacon that permits the scientists to track the insertion in the laboratory.**


Now the damning fact. It was this exact sequence that appears in CoV-2. Proponents of zoonotic origin must explain why the novel coronavirus, when it mutated or recombined, happened to pick its least favorite combination, the double CGG. Why did it replicate the choice the lab's gain-of-function researchers would have made?

When the lab's Shi Zhengli and colleagues published a paper in February 2020 with the virus's partial genome, they omitted any mention of the special sequence that supercharges the virus or the rare double CGG section. Yet the fingerprint is easily identified in the data that accompanied the paper.

Uncanny similarity of unique inserts in the 2019-nCoV spike protein to HIV-1 gp120 and Gag

Prashant Pradhan^{§1,2}, Ashutosh Kumar Pandey^{§1}, Akhilesh Mishra^{§1}, Parul Gupta¹, Praveen

Insert 4



Seq ID	Insert 1	Insert 2	Insert 3	Insert 4
ZHEJ (JNG02020) EPI_ISL_404228	ATGCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
ZHEJ (JNG02020) EPI_ISL_404227	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402120	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_403931	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_403930	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_403929	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402132	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402130	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402129	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402128	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402127	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402125	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402124	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402123	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402121	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
WUHAN2019 EPI_ISL_402119	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
USA02020 EPI_ISL_404255	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
NONHABUR02020 EPI_ISL_403963	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
NONHABUR02020 EPI_ISL_403962	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
IPBCAMS-WH-05/02020 EPI_ISL_403952	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403937	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403936	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403935	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403934	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403933	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
GUANGDONG02020 EPI_ISL_403932	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
BETACOVH/SAWA1/2020 EPI_ISL_40416	ATGCTCTCTGGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAGACTAATTCTCCTCGGGCGGGCACGTAG
BATYUNAN02013 EPI_ISL_402131	ATGTTTCAAGGACCAATGGTACTAAGAGGTTTGAT	ATTACACAAAAACAACAAAAAGTTGGAT	CTCCTGGTGATTCTTCTTCAGGTTGGAC	AGACTCAAACTAATTC.....ACGTAG

Fig.S2: All four inserts are present in the aligned 28 Wuhan 2019-nCoV virus genomes obtained from GISAID. The gap in the Bat-SARS Like CoV in the last row shows that insert 1 and 4 is very unique to Wuhan 2019-nCoV.

3. Chemistry, Manufacturing and Controls (CMC)

a. Product Quality

COMIRNATY Manufacturing Overview

The mRNA in COMIRNATY is a single-stranded, 5'-capped mRNA encoding the full-length SARS-CoV-2 spike glycoprotein derived from the Wuhan-Hu-1 isolate (GenBank MN908947.3 and GenBank QHD43416.1). The antigen-coding RNA sequence is codon-optimized and contains two proline mutations ((b) (4)), which ensures an antigenically optimal trimerized pre-fusion conformation (S-2P). The RNA also contains common structural elements, including 5'-cap, 5'-UTR, 3'-UTR, and poly(A) tail, all of which are designed for mediating high RNA stability and translation efficiency. During RNA transcription, (b) (4) is replaced with the (b) (4) . This nucleoside substitution has been demonstrated to enhance translation of *in vitro* transcribed mRNA while reducing its reactogenicity.

Retroviruses Pseudotyped with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Spike Protein Efficiently Infect Cells Expressing Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme 2

Michael J. Moore,¹ Tatyana Dorfman,¹ Wenhui Li,¹ Swee Kee Wong,¹ Yanhan Li,²
Jens H. Kuhn,^{1,3} James Coderre,⁴ Natalya Vasilieva,⁵ Zhongchao Han,²
Thomas C. Greenough,⁴ Michael Farzan,^{1*} and Hyeryun Choe^{5*}

Partners AIDS Research Center, Brigham and Women's Hospital, and Department of Medicine (Microbiology and Molecular Genetics),¹ and Perlmutter Laboratory, Children's Hospital, and Department of Pediatrics,² Harvard Medical School, Boston, and Program in Molecular Medicine, University of Massachusetts Medical School, Worcester,⁴ Massachusetts; State Key Laboratory of Experimental Hematology, Institute of Hematology and Hospital of Blood Diseases, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences and Peking Union Medical College, Tianjin, China³; and Department of Biology, Chemistry, Pharmacy, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany⁵

Infection of receptor-bearing cells by coronaviruses is mediated by their spike (S) proteins. The coronavirus (SARS-CoV) that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infects cells expressing the receptor angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2). Here we show that codon optimization of the SARS-CoV S-protein gene substantially enhanced S-protein expression. We also found that two retroviruses, simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) and murine leukemia virus, both expressing green fluorescent protein and pseudotyped with SARS-CoV S protein or S-protein variants, efficiently infected HEK293T cells stably expressing ACE2. Infection mediated by an S-protein variant whose cytoplasmic domain had been truncated and altered to include a fragment of the cytoplasmic tail of the human immunodeficiency virus type 1 envelope glycoprotein was, in both cases, substantially more efficient than that mediated by wild-type S protein. Using S-protein-pseudotyped SIV, we found that the enzymatic activity of ACE2 made no contribution to S-protein-mediated infection. Finally, we show that a soluble and catalytically inactive form of ACE2 potently blocked infection by S-protein-pseudotyped retrovirus and by SARS-CoV. These results permit studies of SARS-CoV entry inhibitors without the use of live virus and suggest a candidate therapy for SARS.

T	Act	Project	Year	Sub	Principal Investigator(s)/ Project Leader(s)	Organization	Fiscal Year	Admin IC	Funding IC	FY Total Cost by IC
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-20			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2020	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,001,661
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-20			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2020	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,001,661
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-19			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2019	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,069,830
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-19			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2019	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,069,830
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-18			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2018	NIAID	NIAID	\$984,045
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-18			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2018	NIAID	NIAID	\$984,045
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-17			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2017	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,117,501
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-17			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2017	NIAID	NIAID	\$921,475
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-16			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2016	NIAID	NIAID	\$744,742
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-16			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2016	NIAID	NIAID	\$744,742
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-15			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2015	NIAID	NIAID	\$853,062
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-15			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2015	NIAID	NIAID	\$853,062
					Role of Viral Reservoirs in the Pathogenesis of HIV Disease					
1		ZIAAI000851-15			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2015	NIAID	NIAID	\$1,384,173
					Therapeutic Strategies for the Management of HCV/HIV co- infection					
1		ZIAAI000390-31			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2014	NIAID	NIAID	\$689,091
					Interaction of HIV envelope with cell surface receptors					
1		ZIAAI000883-14			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2014	NIAID	NIAID	\$612,656
					Role of HIV Envelope Proteins in Viral Replication and HIV Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000887-14			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2014	NIAID	NIAID	\$501,264
					Role of Viral Reservoirs in the Pathogenesis of HIV Disease					
1		ZIAAI000851-14			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2014	NIAID	NIAID	\$966,899
					Role of B Lymphocytes in HIV Infection And Pathogenesis					
1		ZIAAI000825-17			FAUCI, ANTHONY S.	NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES	2014	NIAID	NIAID	\$772,682

2014 -2020
NIAID GRANTS
HIV ENVELOPE (GP120)

ANTHONY FAUCI

\$	1,001,661
\$	1,069,830
\$	984,045
\$	1,175,501
\$	921,475
\$	744,742
\$	853,062
\$	1,384,173
\$	689,091
\$	612,656
\$	501,264
\$	966,899
\$	772,682
\$	11,677,081

https://reporter.nih.gov/search/3_Ch3YpiTEum9wv2qeurbA/projects?PI=2403678

Search Results

5 patents

Search Text: FAUCI, ANTHONY

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Principal Investigators CLEAR

☒ FAUCI, ANTHONY S. (89)

Core NIH Project Number	Patent Number	Patent Title	Patent Owner	Primary Agency
Z01AI000887	9896509	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and .alpha.4.beta.7 integrin		NIH
Z01AI000887	9441041	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and .alpha.4.beta.7 integrin		NIH
ZIAAI000887	9896509	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and .alpha.4.beta.7 integrin		NIH
ZIAAI000887	9441041	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and .alpha.4.beta.7 integrin		NIH
Z01AI000887	9193790	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and A4B7 integrin		NIH
ZIAAI000887	9193790	Use of antagonists of the interaction between HIV GP120 and A4B7 integrin		NIH

**NIH SPONSORED AND HAS OWNERSHIP OF
VACCINE NANOTECHNOLOGY FOR A BIOWEAPON**

(12) **United States Patent**
von Andrian et al.

(10) **Patent No.:** US 9,539,210 B2

(45) **Date of Patent:** Jan. 10, 2017

(54) VACCINE NANOTECHNOLOGY

(58) Field of Classification Search

STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

This invention was made with government support under Grant Nos. CA119349, AI069259, AI072252, EB003647, HL056949 and AI061663 awarded by the National Institutes of Health. The government has certain rights in the invention.

9

Y is polyalkylene glycol or polyalkylene oxide. In some embodiments, X is PLGA, PLA or PGA. In some embodiments, Z is absent.

In some aspects, a composition comprising a nanocarrier comprising an immunostimulatory agent is provided. In some embodiments, the composition further comprises an antigen and/or a targeting moiety. In some embodiments, at least one of the antigen, targeting moiety, and immunostimulatory agent is conjugated to a water soluble, non-adhesive polymer. In some embodiments, at least one of the antigen, targeting moiety, and immunostimulatory agent is conjugated to a biodegradable polymer. In some embodiments, at least one of the antigen, targeting moiety, and immunostimulatory agent is conjugated to a biocompatible polymer. In some embodiments, the biocompatible polymer is a conjugate of a water soluble, non-adhesive polymer conjugated to a biodegradable polymer. In some embodiments, the antigen is a B cell antigen. In some embodiments, the B cell antigen is not a T cell antigen. In some embodiments, the nanocarrier further comprises a T cell antigen. In some embodiments, the antigen is a T cell antigen.

In some aspects, a composition comprising a nanocarrier comprising a small molecule, an immunostimulatory agent, and a T cell antigen is provided.

In some embodiments, the small molecule is a toxin. In some embodiments, the toxin is from a chemical weapon, an agent of biowarfare, or a hazardous environmental agent.

November 10, 2021
11:07 PM PST
Last Updated 6 days ago

Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals

Moderna COVID-19 vaccine patent dispute headed to court, U.S. NIH head says

3 minute read

By Julie Steenhuisen



CHICAGO, Nov 10 (Reuters) - U.S. National Institutes of Health scientists played "a major role" in developing Moderna Inc's ([MRNA.O](#)) COVID-19 vaccine and the agency intends to defend its claim as co-owner of patents on the shot, NIH

“ Why has the wicked spurned and shown disrespect to God?
He has said to himself, *“You will not require me to account.”* ”



PSALM 10:13





Public Health Emergency

Public Health and Medical Emergency Support for a Nation Prepared

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Renewal of Determination That A Public Health Emergency Exists

As a result of the continued consequences of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, on this date and after consultation with public health officials as necessary, I, Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby renew, effective October 18, 2021, the January 31, 2020, determination by former Secretary Alex M. Azar II, that he previously renewed on April 21, 2020, July 23, 2020, October 2, 2020, and January 7, 2021, and that I renewed on April 15, 2021 and July 19, 2021, that a public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020, nationwide.

October 15, 2021

/s/

Date

Xavier Becerra